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ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL EVALUATION OF INVESTMENT PROJECTS: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND E.C. PROCEDURES 
SUMMARY 
Public lenders - national and international - assess competing investment 
projects put forward by potential borrowers according to criteria differing 
from those of private investors with respect to both the scope of investment 
analysis and the prices at which costs and benefits are reckoned. This paper 
considers the general principles established in the standard practices develo-
ped by public lenders and.the actual procedures followed by the European Commi-
ssion (documents VIII/700/76-E of March 1976 and subsequent revisions; VIII/ 
2057/79 of February 1979; VIII/527/79-EN and subsequent revisions). 
In general, evaluation procedures of this kind are useful for assembling 
relevant information and testing the consistency of assumptions within the 
proj~ct and within the economy, but the dominance of current prices limits 
the reliability of procedures and turns them into microeconomic exercises 
unless they are viewed as only a stage in the planning process, subject to 
successive rounds of iteration and checks. 
E.C. procedures are found to compare favourably with similar official 
rules for project evaluation,·except for three specific drawbacks: i) the 
imputation of a charge on the historic cost of capital equipment already 
existing and on which aid has been received, which might prevent the fuller 
utilisation of that equipment; ii) the truncated treatment of inflation 
over the life of projects, which introduces a systematic unfavourable bias 
in the evaluation; and iii) the identification of real with economic and of 
nominal with financial profitability, as well as their occasional mixture, 
which is a potential source of confusion and error. 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL EVALUATION OF INVESTMENT PROJECTS 
* GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND E.C. PROCEDURES 
D.M.Nuti 
European University Institute 
Florence 
1. Public interest and the evaluation of investment projects 
Public lenders involved in financing investment projects in poorer 
countries have developed similar practices for the evaluation of com-
peting proposals put forward by potential borrowers. Since invest-
ment projects commit resources and have effects over a long period 
of time some version of discounted cash flow methods is necessarily 
used, of a kind which would be employed by a private direct investor 
or financier, namely the calculation of present values, internal rates 
of return, and other compounding and discounting exercises (such as 
sensitivity analysis, treatment of uncertainty, etc) involving dated 
variables. Public lenders - whether national or international - how-
ever are bound to take into account also general considerations of 
public interest in the borrowing country. The class of investment 
projects submitted to public lenders usually have wider repercus-
sions on the rest of the economy and on the achievement of govern-
ment policy objectives; this is due to the large scale, impact on 
the balance of payments and economic independence, the commitment 
of national public funds, the additional government revenue gene-
rated by the operation of the project, the mobilisation of national 
* This commentary~n the official rules of the European Commission 
for the evaluation of investment projects is the result of direct 
experience as a consultant investment analyst in Central Africa 
in 1979-81 and of subsequent reflection while at the European Uni-
versity Institute in Florence. 
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resources (land, labour, water, etc.) otherwise under-utilised, the 
effects on income distribution among individuals, groups and regions, 
the spillover effects due to the wider use of infrastructures neces-
sary for the implementation of the project. Public lending is in 
practice an enlightened form of economic aid, because long term loans 
in hard currency for above-average risky ventures are usually made 
available at interest and repayment tenns better than market rates. 
Therefore commercial considerations are tempered by benevolent con-
cern for the welfare of the people affected by the project and the 
impact on the realisation of government policies in the borrowing 
country. 
While basic techniques remain the same, the broader evaluation 
of the project differs from that of the direct private investor in 
two major respects: 1) the of economic quantities entered 
on the credit and debit side of the project accounts, and 2) the 
prices at which these economic quantities are reckoned for the 
purpose of decision-making. In current usage~ the evaluation of a 
project from the viewpoint of a private investor is called financial 
evaluation, while the evaluation of the project from the wider view-
point of the economy as a whole and within the context of government 
policy is called economic evaluation1• 
1. We shall follow this terminology because it is widespread -
though by no means universal - and is actually embodied in the 
EC recommended procedures for project analysis considered be-
low. Here "p,rlvate" investor should not be taken literally; 
it includes any economic agency with accounting autonomy, 
using its own capital and/or borrowed funds which it has to 
repay, responsible for the expenditures associated with the 
project and obtaining revenues from the sale of goods and 
services produced by the project. 
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2. The E.C. procedures 
Like other public lenders, the European Commission has evolved 
basic guidelines and procedures for the evaluation of investment 
projects. In 1976 the Directorate General for Development issued 
a document entitled Appraisal of productive projects in agriculture: 
economic analysis and rate of return (VIII/700/76-E of March 1976, 
followed by a number of revised versions such as VIII/701/76-En/ 
Rev.2 of June 1978; the latest version is VIII/701/76, Rev.4 of 
December 1980). In 1979 the same Directorate issued a document 
entitled Format for financing proposals (VIII/2057/79 of February 
1979) and a Manual for preparing and appraising project dossiers 
(VIII/527/79-EN of March 1979, of which the latest version is 
VIII/527/79-EN, Rev. 1 of March 1983) dealing not only with agri-
cultural development projects but also with industry (transport, 
telecommunications, manufacturing, mining, energy, etc.) and 
services (education, training, health, water, sanitation, housing, 
etc.). The first version of the Manual was drawn in response to 
a request by the ACP states' representatives during the negotia-
tions for the renewal of the first Lome Convention; they wanted 
"the Commission departments to spell out clearly their require-
ments with regard to the content of project dossiers, so that the 
national authorities responsible for drawing up the dossiers would 
know exactly what was expected of them" (Manual, Introduction, p.l). 
The document was presented to representatives of the ACP States and 
the Member States, to national authorities and subsequently to con-
sultancy firms responsible for the preparation of dossiers. 
The dominance of public interest in the evaluation of invest-
ment projects by t~ Commission was actually enshrined in the se-
cond Lome Convention. Article 112(2) of Lome II stipulates that 
projects must correspond to the objectives and priorities of the 
ACP State and must be consistent with other development efforts; 
they must be effective, viable and provide a return (from the social 
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as much as from the economic or financial standpoints); and appraisal 
must take into account also the "non-quantifiable effects", notably 
with respect to the environment. Article 108(4)(c) of the Convention 
stipulates also that the ACP States and the Community bear "joint 
responsibility" for "appraising projects ·and programmes and examining 
the extent to which they fit the objectives and priorities and comply 
with the provisions of the Convention". 
Since 1979 considerable experience has been gained from the eva-
luation exercises and many discussions have taken place in various 
bodies (the Article 108 Committee, the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly, 
ACP-EEC experts given the task of formulating sectoral principles, 
ACP-EEC working party on cultural cooperation, meetings of the 
Council's Working Party on Development Cooperation, the Ouagadougou 
(CILSS) Symposium of January 1982 on recurrent expenditure, and so 
on (see Manual, Introduction, p. 3). These developments have been 
embodied in the revised 1983 edition of the Manual. 
The purpose of this paper is that of appraising the E.C. project 
evaluation procedures on the basis of the latest versions of the 
documents indicated above. In order to assess the advantages and 
weaknesses of these procedures it is necessary to distinguish between 
those pertaining to the general approach of public cost/benefit ana-
lysis and those related to the specific version of this general ap-
proach selected by the E.C. Therefore first a general version of 
the approach is considered in its publicly oriented coverage (section 
3) and pricing (section 4), discounting procedures (section 5) and 
cost effectiveness (section 6); the rest of the paper deals with 
the possibility of conflicting economic and financial indicators 
(section 7), the g~Deral advantages and limitations of the approach 
(section 8) and of the E.C. specific procedures (section 9). 
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3. The scope of the evaluation 
A direct private investor1 would consider only those financial costs 
and benefits which are borne by or accrue to himself. Consequently the 
accounts will neglect specifically all other economic effects of the 
project which although identifiable as the direct result of undertaking 
the project do not lead to a specific positive or negative item in the 
investor's own cash flow. A fortiori, the direct private investor will 
neglect all effects of the project to which the market does not attach 
a price2 • Taxes will appear as a cost and government subsidies as a 
net benefit to the investor. 
On the contrary, the public assessment of investment projects 
should take into account, ideally, all the repercussions of the decision 
on the rate of utilisation of resources and/or their displacement every-
where else in the economy, including its impact on the government budget 
and the balance of payments. Thus a tax will appear not only as a cost 
to the investor but also as government revenue, i.e. as a transfer 
internal to the project's economic boundaries which therefore is not 
to be subtracted from the benefits of the project. Conversely, in the 
1. See p. 2, footnote 1. 
2. Occasionally a direct private investor might consider intangible 
effects not appearing in his cash flow, such as the improvement (or 
worsening) of the investor's public image as a result of the wider 
implications of the project. Even in this case, however, the objects 
of concern are not the wider effects of the project on the economy as 
a whole, but theJ?mpact of those effects on the investor and his 
immediate environment. Thus the wider effects of the project, even if 
included by the private investor, would be measured (i.e. valued) 
according to the importance attached to them by the investor, not by 
the public as a whole or the government. 
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public assessment of projects, government subsidies are not added to 
the project benefits because they are exactly offset by additional charges 
on the government budget. Occasionally it may be necessary or useful 
to include possible repercussions even in other countries if they are 
indirectly affected by the project (e.g. pollution across borders; or 
absorption of another country's surplus stocks or surplus capacity, 
etc.). 
4. Actual versus "shadow" prices 
Within the scope appropriate respectively to the public and the 
investor's viewpoint, the relevant economic items (physical flows of 
inputs and outputs, non material effects, changes in the evaluation of 
assets, etc.) are reckoned at different prices. 
Private direct investors use the actual prices effectively paid 
or received in the markets for inputs and outputs. Even if an actual 
transaction is not involved, the price prevailing in actual markets is 
used in the evaluation; for instance, an investor using his own finance 
instead of borrowing will still refer to the actual prevailing interest 
rate to evaluate the present value of his project 1 
The assessment of the project from the overall public viewpoint, 
on the contrary, reckons the inputs and outputs of the project (and any 
other relevant economic effect throughout the economy) at prices which 
1. Occasionally, the market is not organised or functions imperfectly, 
the private investor also may use a measure of "opportunity" cost or 
benefit; this however will be related to his own circumstances and 
preferences, not to the overall national economic situation and 
government policy. 
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take the name of "accounting" or "shadow" prices to distinguish them 
from actual market prices. Shadow prices are designed to measure the 
cost (to the whole economy) of forgoing alternative opportunities of 
using the same resources, or the benefit of not having to incur an 
alternative expenditure avoided because of the output produced by the 
project: hence these shadow prices are expected to measure "opportunity 
costs" and "opportunity benefits" as opposed to costs and benefits 
actually incurred by the investor. Also, opportunity costs and benefits 
are valued, if possible, according to government preferences, expressed 
through its policies. 
Actual market prices may be inaccurate measures of national opportu-
nity costs and government preferences for a number of possible reasons. 
For instance: 
i) there may be a divergence between market price and production 
costs (at the margin, or on average including a normal profit on capital), 
as in the case of monopolistic prices; 
ii) taxation may distort the true picture of social costs and 
returns. If taxes (and subsidies, which are negative taxes) were imposed 
in order to convey to economic agents the wishes of the government as to 
the public desirability of certain commodities (for instance, a tax on 
smoke or other pollutants; a subsidy on the price of education) then taxes 
and subsidies would actually bring about the coincidence of private and 
social costs and returns; notwithstanding the argument of the previous 
section these taxes should be deducted from the benefits of a project 
because they offset a social "bad" for which they compensate the govern-
ment; conversely, subsidies should not be deducted from the investor's 
benefit because the government outlay obtains a counterpart in the higher 
realisation of its objectives. But even when taxes and subsidies have 
the exclusive purpose of bridging the gap between actual prices and the 
/# 
government's values, they do not necessarily close the gap completely, 
and a further adjustment may be still necessary. Besides, most taxes 
have the function of raising government revenue, rather than correcting 
relative prices or incomes; while most subsidies are simply transfers 
from the government to economic agents either directly or through their 
purchase of goods; in this case taxes and subsidies can bring about a 
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divergence between actual prices and opportunity costs. It is difficult 
to distinguish between the two types of taxes (and of subsidies), because 
the distinction refers to the government's intention and cannot be ascer-
tained simply by looking at types and rates of tax, and because both func-
tions may be present in a tax and the distinction can be blurred 1 • This 
is why, rather than introducing these subtle distinctions, the evaluation 
of projects from the public viewpoint simply treats taxes and subsidies as 
tra.nsfers internal to the project. 
iii) the actual price may fail to clear the market, i.e. there may 
be either excess demand or excess supply (or simply excess stocks or 
excess capacity) at the ruling price; for instance, because of price 
control or reserve pricing. The typical cases in a less developed 
country are those of foreign exchange, of which there is usually excess 
demand at the official exchange rate, and of labour, of which there is 
usually excess supply at the ruling wages (at least for unskilled labour). 
Thus for the purpose of the "economic" (i.e. nation-wide and from the 
government viewpoint) evaluation the price of deficit commodities should 
be raised, and of surplus commodities lowered, to their opportunity cost 
(and adjusted for the other factors mentioned here). 
iv) in addition, there may be a divergence between the relative 
market prices - of factors and commodities - and the relative weight 
attributed to those factors and commodities (and to anything else of 
social importance not priced by the market) by the government in con-
formity with the ordering of its own policy objectives. Thus incomes 
generated in a less developed region may be given additional weight 
1. For instance, a tax on tobacco products usually has the dual purpose 
of raising government revenues and of discouraging the consumption 
of a commodity that endangers health. Strictly speaking, the evaluation 
of a project for the production and manufacturing of tobacco could not 
treat tax simply as a transfer to the government budget, because some 
(or all, or more) of it offsets the deterioration of health (and possibly 
greater expenditure from the budget on cancer treatment) that follows 
from the greater consumption of tobacco products encouraged by the 
realisation of the project. 
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in line with government regional policy; an extra weight may be given 
to income accruing to poorer sections of the community, in line with 
government distribution policy. A project promoting national self-
sufficiency and economic independence, or the kind of structural change 
desired by the government for its longer run development strategy would 
qualify for evaluating its output above market price, and so on. 
5. Discounting procedures 
Once the respective physical flows of inputs and outputs over time, 
associated with the economic and financial evaluation, and the prices 
appropriate to each evaluation, are established, the familiar discounting 
procedures are applied in order to summarise the total information about 
the relevant features of the project in a single indicator which is then 
used for the purpose of investment choice. 
Two such indicators dominate the process of choice: the Present 
Value of the project, and its Internal Rate of Return. The Present 
Value is the sum of the net benefits of the project (i.e. benefits net 
of costs, in each year, presumably net benefits being negative during the 
gestation period of the project), the net benefits of each year being 
first discounted back to the beginning of the project by the application 
of an appropriate discount (i.e. interest) rate 1 .By the argument of the 
previous section, the interest rate to be used in the economic evaluation 
may differ from the market rate at which the "private" investor borrows 
(or could lend his own funds). The Present Value is a measurement of the 
increase in wealth which the investor or the nation (according to the type 
of evaluation) obtains as a result of undertaking the project; thus the 
project should only be undertaken if the Present Value is not negative. 
If mutually exclusive projects are compared, all meeting the financial 
constraints of the investor (or of the country in the economic evaluation), 
1) Or rates, if the rate of interest varies according to the length of 
time over which capital funds are lent and borrowed. 
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that with the highest Present Value should be chosen. If a number of 
mutually compatible projects are compared, and the investor (or the 
country) has unlimited access to investment funds at the relevant 
interest rate, then the Present Value of the entire batch of projects 
selected should be maximised, i.e. all projects with a positive Present 
Value should be undertaken, the project "at the margin" - i.e. on the 
line of indifference between undertaking it or not - having a zero Present 
Value. If the investor has only a fixed initial amount to invest (i.e. is 
credit-rationed) he should rank projects according to their Present Value/ 
initial investment ratio, and undertake all the projects he can undertake 
up to the exhaustion of his investment fund (again, as long as only projects 
with a positive Present Value are included) 1 These "rules" follow 
from the meaning of Present Value as additional wealth generated by the 
2 project the moment it starts 
The Internal Rate of Return is the interest rate which, if constant 
over time and if it actually prevailed, would make the Present Value of 
a project equal to zero. Its meaning is the maximum interest rate which 
the investor could pay and still be no worse off as a result of under-
taking the project. It is a convenient way of summarising the financial 
viability of a project and its sensitivity to alternative interest rates, 
because it is the rate at which the investor would be indifferent between 
undertaking the project or not. Not all projects can be summarised in 
this fashion, but if the flow of net benefits over time is first negative 
then positive, as it is in the vast majority of cases, then the internal 
rate of return will exist and will be unique. In this case the investor 
1) If the investor h~ a more complicated time pattern of fixed investment 
funds per year, or if the projects considered have a gestation (i.e. a 
negative net benefit) for more than one period, these simple techniques 
must be replaced by more complex programming techniques. 
2) The maximisation of present value is a rational rule only if the investor 
is in a position to lend and borrow without limits in the relevant range 
and at a lending rate equal to the borrowing rate, and can freely and 
competitively exchange the products of his project for other products. 
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by knowing the internal rate of return of a project could tell immediately 
that the Present Value of the project would be negative for an interest 
rate higher than its internal rate of return, and positive for an interest 
rate lower than its internal rate of return without having to recompute 
the Present Value for alternative interest rates. This is the only 
advantage of looking at the internal rate of return of a project instead 
1 
of its present value It must be stressed that the internal rate of 
return is not a magnitude to maximise, since it is a theoretical maximum 
rate that ·the investor could afford to pay, but the investor cannot ignore 
the fact that he is actually confronted with another actual interest rate 
(or the country with another actual appropriate discount rate if it differs 
from the market interest rate), at which it can finance the investment. 
Therefore the consideration of the internal rate of return of projects 
does not (or at any rate should not) lead to a choice different from the 
maximisation of Present Value. 
A number of questions arising from discounting procedures could be 
clarified straight away: 
1) time horizon: when the expected lifetime of a project (technical 
or economic, whatever the shorter) is longer than the time horizon over 
which net benefits are considered, the choice of the time horizon 
introduces an element of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the project. 
This is avoided by the addition to the net benefits of the last period 
considered of an item for the terminal value of the capital equipment in 
existence at that time, evaluated not on the basis of historical cost but 
at the market value expected to prevail at that time. 
2) choice of units: it is a matter of indifference whether the time 
flow of net benefits is measured at the constant prices of the initial 
period, or at the c~~ent prices of each period; or whether the internal 
currency is used, or an international currency or basket of currencies; 
as long as the interest rate (and the internal rate of return) are also 
1) In particular, if credit is rationed the ranking of projects according 
to their internal rate of return may lead to the selection of inferior 
projects. 
- 12 -
expressed in terms of the same units. Thus if calculations are at 
constant prices a real rate of interest should be used for the calcu-
lation of the present value and for the comparison with the present 
value of the project; if current prices are used in domestic currency, 
then the nominal rate of interest should be used at which the domestic 
currency is lent and borrowed for the same purpose; if an international 
currency is used, then the interest rate in that currency should be used 
for the purpose, real or nominal according to whether constant or 
current prices in that currency have been used. 
3) amortisation: the amortisation of debt incurred to finance the 
investment project should not be included among costs, otherwise invest-
ment costs would be exactly double counted in the calculation of present 
value; in the calculation of the internal rate of return, investment costs 
would not count exactly double (unless the internal rate of return was 
equal to the interest rate) but would still be grossly over-estimated. 
4) replacement: the replacement cost of capital goods having a life-
time shorter than the time horizon assumed for the project evaluation 
could be accounted indifferently, for the purpose of the calculation of 
present value, as a cost incurred at the time of expected replacement, 
or as an annuity charge compounding over time to its historical cost 
(at a real rate of interest if the flow is reckoned at constant prices, 
at a money rate of interest if the flow is reckoned at current prices; 
the use of amortisation of expected replacement cost overvalues if 
there is inflation the incidence of capital costs). But for the calcu-
lation of the internal rate of return the annuity charge is inappropriate, 
because it distorts the calculation of the internal rate by the use of an 
actual interest rate; for that purpose replacement costs are best reckoned 
as a cost incurred the time of expected replacement. Thus this is the 
best way of accounting for replacement meeting the requirements of both 
present value and internal rate calculations. 
5) uncertainty: sometimes it is suggested that the uncertainty 
surrounding both the physical flows of inputs and outputs associated with 
the project and the (market or shadow) prices at which those inputs and 
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outputs should be reckoned in an unknown future should be accounted by 
deducting from the internal rate of return of the project an allowance 
for risk, or by adding the same small allowance to the interest rate 
used to calculate the project's present value, which is the same thing. 
This is inappropriate, beca~se the arithmetic of discounting procedures 
compounds the impact of uncertainty over time in such a way as to give 
excessive weight to the uncertainty surrounding the magnitudes of varia-
bles belonging to a more distant future. This might appear to have some 
logic, because of the greater uncertainty surrounding a more distant 
future, but given the extraordinary power of compound interest over time, 
this procedure is bound to exaggerate the impact of uncertainty on project 
selection. In addition, in this way the impact of uncertainty is made to 
depend excessively on the actual discount rate used; and the treatment of 
alternative projects associated with different time profile of uncertainty 
is defective. It would appear that the use of statistical measurements of 
uncertainty is preferable, but this also has drawbacks: i) in this context 
uncertainty is often subjective, i.e. difficult for a project-analyst to 
establish; ii) the choice of the appropriate statistical measure of 
uncertainty (variance, standard deviation, etc. of the present value of 
the project of its internal rate of return) is arbitrary; iii) the choice 
between alternative features of the probability distribution of results 
could not be made a priori but would have to refer to the preferences 
of the decision-maker. In view of all these difficulties it seems better 
to explore the sensitivity of the project indicators (present value, or 
internal rate of return) to alternative levels of uncertain magnitudes, 
in order to establish some assessment of the importance of uncertainty 
about different variables, rather than attempt a more ambitious treatment 
directly in the decision-making process. One important aspect of uncertain-
ty is the possible contribution of the project (possibly uncertain in itself) 
to the overall prof~e of uncertainty, for the investor or the economy. 
6) inflation: the problems arising from inflation are already covered 
above under "choice of units" and "replacement". Namely, the flow of costs 
(including replacement) and benefits (including terminal capital) should 
be adjusted for inflation throughout the project's time horizon if a money 
rate of interest is used to calculate present value and a money internal 
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rate of return is sought. Otherwise, costs and benefits should be at 
constant prices of the starting period, but then a real interest rate 
should be used (equal to the difference between nominal interest rate 
and expected inflation rate 1, divided by one plus the expected inflation 
rate). If a rate of return is calculated for constant prices data it will 
be a real internal rate of return. 
Finally, an additional indicator of the project's expected perfor-
mance is sometimes derived from discounting procedures: the Internal 
Exchange Rate. The concept is analogous to the internal rate of return. 
The Internal Exchange Rate is the rate which - if it was constant over 
time and actually prevailed - would make the present value of the project 
equal to zero. As long as the project makes a net contribution to balance 
of payments over time, the higher the Internal Rate of Exchange (expressed 
as amount of foreign currency per one unit of local currency) the better the 
terms on which the investor obtains foreign currency from the project (or 
saves the country foreign currency by replacing imports) over its lifetime. 
As in the case of the Internal Rate of Return, this is another form of 
sensitivity analysis, which can be undertaken instead of exploring the 
impact of alternative rates of exchange in the neighbourhood of the actual 
2 
rate 
1) The notion of a single inflation rate is an oversimplification, because 
is a double average across years and across products. It is better to 
a money rate of interest and adjust all items of costs and benefits for 
particular inflation rate appropriate to each of them. 
2) If the project made a negative contribution to the balance of payments, 
this would not automatically disqualify it from acceptance, though the 
implications would have to be borne in mind in a country whose development 
is impeded by ex~ernal constraints. In this case, however, the lower the 
internal rate 6f'exchange the better the project is, because the investor 
is a net "buyer", as it were, and a not a net "seller" of foreign 
An analogous reversal of the interpretation of internal rates takes place 
in the Internal Rate of Return: the lower the better, if the project 
involves an act of "disinvestment", i.e. positive net benefits in the 
initial periods of project life. 
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6. A variation of the approach: cost effectiveness 
These discounting procedures simultaneously answer the question of 
whether the additional capacity generated by the investment should be 
created, and in what technical form (i.e. what location, degree of mecha-
nisation, gestation, durability, choice of alternative inputs, etc.) by 
means of the comparison of the alternative streams of net benefits asso-
ciated with different ways of generating the same capacity. However, 
sometimes the question of whether to create the extra capacity associated 
with the project does not arise, for instance because the project is under-
taken by a public agency and the government is committed to create that 
capacity; or the question could not be answered - at least in financial 
terms - because the output of the project is not saleable (for instance, 
some health services). 
In this case the financial and economic analysis must be limited to 
the cost effectiveness of alternative ways of generating that capacity. 
Thus the discounting procedures discussed above are used exclusively to 
calculate the present value of the expenditures associated with the pro-
ject, in order to choose the project variant with the miminum present 
value of expenditures. 
It is worth stressing that this procedure may be appropriate also 
to projects producing a saleable output, if that output is essential and 
cannot be obtained through international trade (because of rigid foreign 
exchange constraints due to stagnant and unstable export earnings and 
strict limits to foreign exchange borrowing; or bottlenecks in the trans-
port capacity to handle foreign trade; of non tradeability of the output). 
In this case the government has no option but to expand productive capacity, 
it has no other choice, and the only question arising is one of cost-effective-
ness, namely of whefe to locate the project in the country, and what production 
techniques to adopt. To say that there is no other choice is like saying, 
by definition, that the cost effectiveness version of the project has a 
sufficiently high present value and internal rate of return (and internal 
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rate of exchange) not only to be undertaken, but also to take priority 
over alternative projects generating tradeable goods or non-essential 
capacity. In theory, this outcome could be obtained in the economic 
evaluation of the project by using a sufficiently high shadow rate of 
exchange or price of the output, or a sufficiently low (or even negative, 
if necessary) discount rate, but this is not usually done, and if it was 
done would be bound to be regarded as "unrealistic" or "inappropriate" 
by government officers or aid donors; at any rate, it would make the 
project look less attractive than it deserves, probably - and paradoxi-
cally - less attractive than non essential projects producing a non-
saleable output which are automatically excluded from tests other than 
cost-effectiveness. Financially the project could be made to look worth-
while if a sufficiently high government subsidy was put on the output of 
the project, but the government may be justifiably reluctant to do so 
because of the necessity to subsidise equally the output of already 
existing projects of the same kind, especially if in private hands; this 
would put a disproportionate burden on government finance and could have 
undesirable side effects on income distribution. In this case the best 
way of making the project financially worthwhile would be a government 
subsidy to the investment cost of the project (in the form of a contri-
bution to interest charges, or to repayment of debt, or the direct 
financing of some of the investment expenditure out of the government 
budget); this would not have the negative side-effects described and 
would not commit the government to subsidising output indefinitely in 
the future. · These measures for the improvement of the financial profile 
of a vital project, however, would reduce - though not eliminate - its 
economic attraction, because of the standard practice - reviewed above 
in section 4 - of subtracting g~vernment subsidies from the financial 
benefits of the project. Thus this kind of project should be a prime 
candidate for fo~eign aid; yet donors are often deeply entrenched in 
standard evaluation procedures and may discard a vital project channelling 
their aid towards less essential and even non-productive projects. 
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7. Conflicting economic and financial indicators. 
If a project passes both financial and economic tests of acceptability 
the only problem that might arise is that investors in the private sector 
may be applying an even stricter financial test (such as the recoupment of 
capital expenditure out of the profits of the first three or four years of 
operation of the project). Even in that case the government could offer tax 
exemptions or other financial incentives in order to induce private firms 
to undertake the project, or simply make a public agency undertake the 
project. Finance would be forthcoming from private or foreign sources. 
If the project is financially viable but does not pass the test of 
economic acceptance the government could apply financial disincentives, 
control access to credit for use in the project, or simply prohibit the 
realisation of the project. 
The real problem arises if the project is viable economically and 
not financially, because of the asymmetry in the powers of government, 
which can prohibit but not order the realisation of a project by the 
private sector. In theory, the government could make the project 
financ~ally viable.by a system of subsidies, but the same problems 
l 
discussed in the previous section would arise (financial burden from 
the extension of the same subsidies to similar activities, reluctance 
to commit the government to subsidies too far into the future, detraction 
of subsidies from the economic value of the project, official hostility 
towards the project), with the same conclusion: that the project should 
qualify for budgetary grant or foreign aid to cover at least part of its 
capital expenditure. 
In fact, the purpose of the financial evaluation of projects of 
public interest should not be that of deciding whether or not to under-
take the project, but that of identifying - if they are economically 
L 
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viable - the extent and the nature of the subsidies required to convey the 
public interest to the private investor. If this is not done, the entire 
purpose of the economic evaluation is defeated. But there is the danger that 
only financially worthwhile projects will be checked for economic viability, 
thus turning the economic evaluation into an additional test, and not 
the paramount test for the acceptability of the project. Or projects 
could be assessed on the basis of some kind of mixture of its economic 
and financial indicators, thereby demanding a correspondingly greater 
economic attraction to compensate for a poorer financial profile; apart 
from the non-homogeneity of economic and financial indicators, this could 
also lead to the rejection of projects which are best from the viewpoint 
of the economy as a whole and the government economic policy. 
Paradoxically, a project with economic but not financial viability 
is more likely to be less favourably treated if it is being considered 
by the public sector than if it is considered by a private company. In 
fact, a private company would be able to draw a clear line between the 
expenditures of the project pertaining to the private sector and the class 
of expenditures normally falling under the responsibility of the govern-
ment (especially major works on social infrastructures: roads, power lines, 
communications, schools, hospitals, etc.). This separation could then make 
the private side of the project very attractive, enabling the private 
company to negotiate with the government the provision of that social 
infrastructure from a strong negotiating point; the government would 
have to consider these claims, and in turn would be in a good position 
to ask potential donors to fund expenditures which are desirable per se, 
and which in addition would promote such financially sound developments. 
Instead, when the same project is .considered by the public sector the 
line between commercial operations and the provision of infrastructure 
is not drawn, the en~re cost of social infrastructure is imputed to the 
project, there is no analogous outside agent to put the case and negotiate 
with the government for the provision of the necessary infrastructures, 
the project is made to look financially unattractive and given a lower 
priority by both government and potential donors. 
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8. Advantages and limitations of the approach 
The advantages of the evaluation procedure discussed so far derive 
basically from two factors: i) the extension of the analysis from the 
limited scope of the project to the economy as a whole, thus attempting 
to reconcile the micro- and the macroeconomic approaches and to bridge 
the gap between partial and general equilibrium; ii) the extension of the 
analysis to include a consideration of government policy objectives. 
These are in fact the purpose of moving from the financial to the economic 
evaluation of projects. The use of these procedures is meant to decentra-
lise investment decisions to the level of investors, credit institutions 
and relevant government offices without reference to a national economic 
plan - except in so far as the plan is a clear statement of government 
policy objectives and their relative ranking. 
The limitations of these procedures derive from the drawbacks of 
such a decentralisation, and in particular from the overwhelming role of 
prices (whether actual or "shadow") and especially present prices in the 
assessment, compared to the relative neglect of the relationship between 
the quantities of inputs and outputs postulated in all the various 
investment projects in different sectors, and the total amount of those 
quantities in the economy as a whole. Various problems of internal 
consistency in the evaluations of projects arise: i) consistency between 
the assumptions about the price system made in the evaluation of different 
projects; ii) consistency between total resources and the uses postulated 
in the projects; iii) consistency between the prices postulated in the 
evaluation of projects and the changes in productive capacity resulting 
from the realisation of the proje~ts. If the country had unlimited 
access to international capital markets and unimpeded trade at predict-
able and stable terms~his would not matter so much, since any surplus 
or deficit in any commodity or in production as a whole could be made 
good in this way. But this is not the world in which we live, and it 
is precisely the danger of those inconsistencies that had led to the 
emergence of development planning, especially in the less developed 
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countries. But even in countries with advanced forms of economic planning 
the danger remains of a possible inconsistency between the national plan 
targets and the total inputs and outputs of the investment projects. 
Thus even in the planned economy the evaluation of projects can only be 
a stage in the planning process, subject to successive rounds of checks 
for reaching the internal consistency of project evaluation and plan. 
For instance suppose that a wheat scheme is evaluated on the basis 
of a set of prices drawn from current experience and projection of trends. 
If the return on this kind of project is low not much more wheat will be 
produced; if as a consequence a wheat shortage appears, wheat could be imported 
and paid for by exporting whatever product has been expanded; if this is 
not enough, the necessary wheat could be paid for by borrowing abroad. 
But if, as it is invariably the case, terms of trade are not stable, export 
earnings are stagnant, there is no further access to borrowing, and the 
capacity of the transport system limits wheat imports, the result of the 
exclusive reliance on decentralised investment procedures - without 
checking the implications of all investment projects and their relations 
with the rest of the economy - may very well be famine and starvation. 
Thus, the use of the investment procedures discussed in the previous 
sections should be supplemented by a closer scrutiny of the investment 
trend in projects in the same sector, and in sectors competing for the 
same kinds of inputs. If it was found, for instance, that there was not 
enough investment in the same sector in the rest of the country, there 
would be a case for applying to the project under examination the test 
of cost effectiveness instead of the more stringent test of the rate of 
return calculated at present prices, or for raising the postulated output 
price. 
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9. Specific features of EC procedures for project evaluation 
Beside sharing the advantages and limitations of the general 
approach reviewed above, EC procedures, like all actual rules by 
similar agencies, have specific features differing from the standard 
approach (see official documents VIII/70/76 Rev.4 of December 1980, 
and VIII/527/79-EN/Rev.l of March 1983). 
These procedures in many respects compare very favourably with 
similar official rules for project evaluation, such as those of UNIDO 
and of OECD. For instance, they make a more limited use of international 
prices, which in view of the constraints of most developing countries is 
a sensible and more pragmatic approach. They avoid the complications of 
measuring all values in units of consumption (UNIDO) or in a foreign 
currency (OECD). They do not attempt to trace the entire (direct and 
total indirect) foreign currency content of domestic non-traded goods 
(as in the OECD rules). They do not attach a different weight to the 
value added generated by the project according to whether it is consumed 
or reinvested, which is theoretically debatable and in practice requires 
an additional forecasting exercise of dubious reliability (OECD). They 
do not regard the import content of workers' consumption as a deduction 
from the economic benefits of the project (as in the OECD rules), and 
rightly so, because additional consumption is of benefit to the country 
and if it involves imported goods the usual allowances for the scarcity 
of foreign exchange could be used, instead ·Of deducting imported consumption 
of previously unemployed workers from the economic evaluation of the pro-
ject (besides, in the OECD practice this contradicts their assumptions 
about unlimited trade opportunities). The EC procedures also have the 
merit of considering closely the relations between projects and the na-
tional plan • 
._ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
------------~-------------------------------------------------------
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There are a number of specific aspects of the EC procedures which 
are open to question. The first is the provision, in the economic eva-
luation of projects, of an imputed charge on the historical cost of capital 
equipment already existing and on which aid has been received. The contro-
versial nature of this charge is recognised in the EC procedures but 
nevertheless the charge is requested. There are instances in which this 
practice may lead to the rejection of projects designed precisely to 
utilise more fully the capital provided by past aid. For instance, we 
could think of a hypothetical irrigation plant (without canalisation) 
financed out of past aid; if a subsequent land development project 
providing among other the canalisation required to utilise the plant 
was imputed a realistic charge on past aid it may prove unacceptable, 
thereby leading to the waste of that aid, the irrigation plant having 
no alternative use. The ability of the new project to pay a charge on 
already existing capital financed out of aid is a retrospective test of 
the wisdom of spending aid on that capital asset in the first place, not 
a test of the desirability of the further utilisation of that asset. The 
charge appropriate to the new project is not to be calculated on the histori-
cal cost of that capital asset, but on the market value that that asset 
might have - if any - in alternative uses other than in the project under 
consideration. 
A second aspect of the EC procedures open to question is the treat-
ment of inflation. The procedures recommend that the costs and benefits 
of the project should be reckoned at prices higher than those of the first 
period, to allow for inflation, only during the first few periods of 
operation (say, five or six years). After that no further adjustment is 
made, "in view of the total uncertainty concerning price prospects". This 
way of dealing with inflation is unfavourable to the project, because 
inflation raises cap~tal costs - which occur nearly completely in the 
initial years - but is not allowed to raise the benefits throughout the 
lifetime of the project. If inflation is expected to take place at the 
.-
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same rate for both inputs and outputs during those years, the occurrence 
of inflation benefits slightly the project by raising output values more 
than capital expenditure with respect to the case of price stability, but 
does not benefit the project thereafter, subjecting the project to a test 
of real profitability which by comparison with the private evaluation of 
project may be very strict indeed. Moreover, if the cost of capital goods 
inflates faster than the value of output during the first few years of the 
project, but no allowance is made for inflation in the price of the pro-
duct thereafter, it is possible for inflation to make the project finan-
cially less attractive, instead of making it more attractive as one would 
normally expect. After all, there is no record of developing countries 
experiencing long-term price stability outside the socialist bloc (and 
even in those countries inflation has been increasing at an accelerated 
rate in recent years). A preferable way of dealing with inflation might 
be that of reckoning all costs and benefits at constant prices, those of 
the initial year, thus obtaining a real internal rate of return. This 
real rate of return could then be compared with the money rate of inter-
est to infer what rate of inflation (or deflation) would make the present 
value of the project equal to zero; this rate of inflation could then be 
compared with past trends and as long as it was lower than a rate of 
inflation considered as plausible the project could be accepted. Alter-
natively, the real rate of return of the project could be compared with 
the real rate of profit experienced in the country or in other countries. 
This, incidentally, is reported to be close to zero both in developing 
and in advanced countries; in these conditions, a test real rate of the 
order of 5-10% appears an exceedingly severe test for any project any-
where in the world. 
Another aspect qj the EC procedures open to question is the propo-
sition that the financial rate of return should be a nominal rate, while 
the economic rate of return should be a real one. There is no reason why 
a particular approach should be identified with real or nominal variables 
- 24 -
(except in so far as the time preferences of the government - or for that 
matter of anybody - would presumably be expressed in terms of real consump-
tion; but it is one of the advantages of the EC procedures that no attempt 
is made to relate the economic rate of return to a notional rate of time 
preferences of the community). As we have seen above (Section 5) the choice 
of units - real or nominal - is immaterial as long as homogeneous magnitudes 
are compared, i.e. a real rate of return is compared with a real rate of 
interest and a nominal rate of return is compared with a nominal interest 
rate. The EC association of economic analysis with real variables and 
financial analysis with nominal variables would therefore have no conse-
quence, were it not for the ambiguity surrounding the comparison of 
the economic with the financial rate of return and the money rate of 
interest. We have argued above (section 7) that the valuation of a 
project according to whether both the economic and financial rate of 
return exceed their respective test rates is in itself too strict a test, 
given the primacy of the economic evaluation and the subsidiary use of 
the financial-evaluation to ascertain the desirability and extent of 
government agencies and potential donors' intervention. We have also 
questioned the meaningfulness of using a combination of economic and 
financial parameters. This is a doubtful exercise even if homogeneous 
magnitudes (either real or nominal) were being compared; if, in addi-
tion, this dubious comparison involves a hybrid mixture of real and nomi-
nal indicators, the outcome will be meaningless, indeed positively mis-
leading. 
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10. Conclusion 
In common with official investment rules issued by other public 
agencies, the EC procedures have the advantages of extending project 
evaluation from the scope of the investor to the economy as a whole, 
of including the consideration of government policy objectives, and 
of decentralising investment decisions from national bodies to in-
vestors and to lower level government offices. Like similar proce-
dures, EC rules suffer from the dominance of current prices and the 
possibilities of internal inconsistency in the evaluation of pro-
jects (between prices postulated in different projects, between total 
resources and uses in the projects actually selected, between the 
prices postulated in the evaluation of projects and the changes in 
productive capacities resulting from the realisation of the pro-
jects). Even in a planned economy the evaluation of projects 
according to this kind of procedures must be viewed as only a stage 
in the planning process, subject to successive rounds of iterations 
and checks. 
The specific features of EC procedures in many respects com-
pare favourably with similar official rules for project evaluation, 
such as those of UNIDO and of OECD. Three specific drawbacks how-
ever deserve mention and further consideration by the Directorate 
General for Development: the imputation of a charge on the histo-
rical cost of capital equipment already existing and on which aid 
has been received, which might prevent the fuller utilisation of that 
equipment; the truncated treatment of inflation over the life of projects, 
which introduces a systematic unfavourable bias in the evaluation; and the 
identification of real with economic and of nominal with financial profita-
bility, as well as th;fr occasional mixture, which is a potential source of 
confusion and error. 
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